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CHAPTER I
THE PROBLEM
As is the case with many Sub-Saharan African Countries, Lesotho has
low agricultural productivity. Crop yields are tremendously low. Average
yields have been declining for a long period of time despite all the
efforts by government to improve and encourage food production. Low
productivity makes it impossible for the country to be self-sufficient
even in the very basic food requirements. With the population growing
every year and the amount of arable land per rural household decreasing,
there is a high probability that Lesotho will experience even more
problems with feeding its population if the declining trend in yields is
allowed to persist
.
A decline in agricultural output in Lesotho beginning as early as
1950 has been identified by the World Bank. A decline of 40 percent in
agricultural output between 1950 and 1970 was cited by the Bank as
evidence of need for major additional investment in agriculture-'. Wykstra
(cited in JASPA Employment and Advisory Mission, 1979 p. 86) reported
output and yield figures for 1950, 1960, 1970 and 1976 to illustrate a
drop of 59 percent in output and a sharp decline in yields. Low yields are
caused by a variety of factors some of which include poor and infertile
soil lacking in plant nutrients and inappropriate structure which makes
seedbeds unstable and subject to erosion . Apart from soil deficiencies,
the timing and reliability of rainfall present severe limitations to crop
''IBRD - Appraisal of Basic Agricultural Services Project. Report no.
1524. 1978
growth especially in the southern part of the country where erratic
rainfall conditions frequently can result in very low precipitation. There
is evidence that a high percentage of crop failures in Lesotho is due to
drought compared to other factors such as frost, hail, insects and weeds,
soil erosion and poor cultivation practices (table 1).
Table 1: Estimated Area Under Crop Failure by Cause
1983/84
Cause of Crop Failure Hectares Percent
1 6
9
75 5
9
2 1
6 1
12 9
Frost
Hail
Floods
Drought
Pests
Weeds
Animals
Others
609
345
28802
339
815
2339
4890
Total 38139 100.0
Source: Bureau of Statistics - Annual Statistical Bulletin,
Maseru, Lesotho 1984.
Most analysts also consider labor migration from Lesotho a
contributor to declining agricultural production. Labor migration to
diamond mines in the Republic of South Africa provides an outlet for many
Basotho to earn a better living than they can earn for agricultural labor
in Lesotho. High wages in the mines have raised the standard of living of
many rural families of mine workers who remain in Lesotho. However, the
disadvantages which cannot be measured entirely in monetary terms, are of
far reaching consequences economically, culturally and politically.
Migration causes men Co be away from home at critical times when there is
heavy agricultural work to be done, leaving older men, women and children
to plough and to plant as best they can. Wykstra^ in his findings noted
that manpower scarcity or labor shortage is "a material explanation for
recent economic declines in Lesotho ' s farming sector"
.
There are undoubtedly shortages of labor in some areas at peak
periods but it is difficult to say to what extent it is responsible for
low productivity in agriculture
. The economic question is what are the
returns to the farm and to the economy of additional labor inputs into
agriculture (or the returns foregone by labor withdrawal) and how do these
compare with returns to labor in alternative pursuits. A Mosotho farmer
is not irrational and unresponsive to economic incentives. With the
constraints he faces, including constraints regarding ecological risk,
lack of relevant knowledge and technology and the unavailability of
supplies and equipment as well as unreliable markets, it is clear that he
makes a judgement based on where his labor earns more.
In 1976 the net expected farm income per year from a 5-acre Lesotho
farm was at most M80.00 for subsistence crops and M60.00 for cash crops.
At the same time minimum annual wage for unskilled manual labor in Lesotho
was M300.00 (raised to M480 . 00 in 1978). When these amounts are compared
to about Ml, 100. 00 in cash and kind for mine work in 1976, the attraction
of employment in the mines is apparent. While it is true that low land
fertility reduces returns to farming and encourages migration, it is also
necessary to recognize that the existing capacity of land is not only a
Wyks tra R . A
_
Farm labor in Lesotho
. Scarcity or Surplus
.
LASA
Discussion Paper No 5. Ministry of Agriculture, Lesotho 1978.
-^^^9^
function of its inherent characteristics, but it is also related to the
amount of human effort invested in it.
Sample surveys of area based projects^ (Khomo-khoana project Survey
1978, Thaba-Bosiu Project survey 1973-1977 and Phuthiatsana Project survey
1977 and Senqu River Valley Project 1975) showed that the gross margins
from crops are both low and erratic, with sales not even covering non-
labor costs. Most surveys showed that daily returns from agriculture were
of the order of MO. 10 to MO. 40^ ( based on 1973-77 prices) per hectare.
Average returns of this magnitude are unlikely to be attractive to anyone
especially when substantially higher paid employment exists.
Farming practices of most Basotho farmers are very far removed from
those designed to achieve good yields and increased long run
productivity
.
The farmers plough ineffectively so that the seedbed is
inadequately prepared. Fertilizer has been widely adopted in Lesotho
,
However it is reported in the World Bank report (IBRD 1980 b. Annex 7
p. 24) that; "... the use of fertilizer in the absence of a range of
complementary husbandry practices does not usually result in large
increases in yields.
.
." This is not atypical of experience elsewhere, but
" fertilizer appears to be commonly used in Lesotho as if it were a
substitute for good husbandry rather than a complement to it". The World
Bank Mission found that in Lesotho fertilizer has been used largely to
increase the amount of food produced per unit of time . In other words
^JASPA Employment Advisory Mission - Options for a Dependent Economy.
Development. Employment and Equity Problems in Lesotho. 1979 p. 87.
^JASPA Employment Advisory Mission- Options for a Dependent Economy.
Development. Employment and Equity Problems in Lesotho. 1979.
fertilizers are used as a substitute for labor -intensive crop production
methods. So as long as this remains the main reason for using fertilizers
in crop production, it is quite unlikely that fertilizer use will achieve
the intended goal of increased productivity through increased yields.
Lesotho's economic history is one of growth followed by decline. The
Basotho were not traditionally a mountain dwelling people, but after the
loss of the lowlands they adapted to what remained. The lowlands that
were left were reasonably fertile and the highlands good grazing land. By
1873, Lesotho was exporting wool and grain. Murray (1980) and Spray (1975)
quoted in Low (1986) have documented how Lesotho changed from being the
granary of the Orange Free State before 1900 to a labor reserve for South
Africa today.
Demand for Lesotho produce heightened with the discovery of diamonds
in the Orange Free State (1867) and later with the opening of the gold
mines in the Transvaal (South Africa) 1885. Lesotho's food grain exports
reached a maximum in the 1910-1920 period. After this time exports
declined as South Africa imposed trade restrictions, Lesotho's subsistence
requirement increased as population increased, soil fertility slowly
declined, technology remained stagnant and more Basotho participated in
labor migration to South Africa. The conditions worsened, so that by 1930
Lesotho was a net importer of maize^.
The former statements indicate that historically Lesotho was not a
net importer of food grains that it is at present. Things happened that
turned the whole machinery of agriculture around. This is the main concern
'Brokken, Ray et. al
.
Marketing of Grains. Pulses and Vegetables in
Lesotho. Farming Systems Research Division, Bulletin RD-B-47. Maseru 1986.
of the government and food policy makers in Lesotho, which has led to the
government of Lesotho taking initiatives as well as introducing incentives
in crop production in an effort to reverse the continued deterioration
of agricultural production.
Many governments with good intentions all over the world have tried
to intervene in agricultural activities with the hope of increasing food
production and assisting the small farmers. Most governments including the
government of Lesotho have introduced foreign aid projects and foreign
expertise to run agricultural projects in the country. Often when such
projects are initiated the real needs of the farmers are only temporarily
met because project activities are not self sustaining after the life of
the project. Ironically, the most elemental needs of farmers such as
availability of markets , supplies and information through sustainable
institutions have not been perpetuated.
The purpose of this paper therefore is to further delineate Lesotho's
food problem; discuss selected efforts and programs by the government of
Lesotho to increase agricultural productivity; and to evaluate a proposed
additional food program option. The main focus of the paper will be on
incentives applied to crop production in Lesotho, and an evaluation of
achievements and identification of problems associated with implementation
of incentive programs
.
CHAPTER II
RESOURCE ENVIRONMENT FOR CROPS
The total land area of Lesotho is estimated at 30,355 square
kilometers (11,720 square miles). The country lies between the southern
latitudes 28 degrees and 31 degrees and the eastern longitude 27 degrees
and 30 degrees. Lesotho is divided into 10 administrative districts which
fall on one or more of the four ecological zones namely the lowlands,
foothills, mountains and Senqu River Valley. The lowlands, mainly on the
western side of the country have altitudes from 5,000 - 6,000 feet above
sea level, and are about a third of the land area. Soils are poor sandy
loams impoverished by exploitive cropping. The foothills form a belt at
5,000 - 7,000 feet above sea level to the northeast of the lowlands. This
is a rolling plateau country mainly pasture broken up by ridges and river
valleys. It is about one-sixth of the land area of the country. The soils
are clay loams of somewhat higher fertility Chan the lowlands but also
suffer from exhaustion. The mountains account for the remaining half of
the land area. The mountains range from 7,000 to 11,000 feet above sea
level. Soils are thin fertile black clays. This land is fit for most part
only for Intensive grazing, but population pressure has led to increased
attempts to cultivate it. Overall, the soil is poorly suited to cropping
and is badly eroded.
Rainfall is an important factor especially in a predominantly dry
country like Lesotho because of Its Influence on crop yields. Drought,
hall and frost are major risk factors in crop production. The normal
average rainfall over the entire country is 730 mm a year, although it
varies among the regions, with the highlands receiving 760 mm followed by
the northern part with a normal of 750 mm and the southern region which
is usually drier with a normal of 690 mm per year.
Long term average rainfall varies from 682 mm to 819 mm in the
lowlands and from 586 mm to 900 mm in the highlands. Temperatures in the
lowlands range from a maximum of 28.7 degrees Centigrade or higher in
summer, to a minimum of well below -1.5 degrees Centigrade in winter. In
1984 the highest observed temperature in the lowlands was 35.1 degrees
Centigrade (February). A minimum of -12.5 degrees Centigrade was observed
at Maputsoe in June^. In the highlands the temperature range is normally
27.5 degrees Centigrade to -6.1 degrees Centigrade for maximum and minimum
in summer and winter respectively. A major characteristic that marks the
difference between the lowlands and highlands is colder winters in the
highlands with wider fluctuations between maximum and minimum
temperatures. Lesotho often experiences dry periods which adversely affect
crops as well as pasture land.
The population of Lesotho is 1.6 million (1986 Population Census), of
which 85 percent is rural
. The overall population growth rate is 2.4
percent per year. There is however higher population growth in urban
areas, possibly because of migration from rural to urban areas in search
of employment and jobs. The growing population and the deterioration of
the land base imposes a strain on the land with fewer households having
access to cultivable land, hence the number of rural households without
^Bureau of statistics - Annual Statistical Bulletin Maseru, Lesotho
1984.
land is increasing. The principal impact of population growth appears in
the declining number of fields per household'. In 1970 there were 212,228
rural households in Lesotho. The number of rural households without land
was 26,919 (12.7 percent). The number of landless households had increased
to 70,593 in 1986 (25.4 percent). Population per square kilometer of total
area in 1976, 1980 and 1984 was 40, 44, and 48 respectively. In the same
years the population density per arable land increased as is shown in
table 2.
Table 2: Population per sq km of total area and per sq km of
arable land.
Year Density on total land Density on arable land
1976 40 422
1980 44 446
1984 48 493
Source: Bureau of Statistics - Annual Statistical Bulletin
Maseru, Lesotho 1984
Only 30 percent of the land area is arable. Even in this area (apart
from a strip of foothills and lowlands around the western borders of the
country and scattered river valleys in the mountain areas), good cropping
soils and reliable rainfall are rare, occurring fairly widely in the
north, but dropping sharply towards the south. While there are some areas
of good quality soils particularly in the northern lowlands, for the most
part the soils are highly erodible and poor in structure. Apart from soil
deficiencies; the amount of rain, timing and reliability of rainfall
Ntsane Chaka
; Eckert Jerry.- Lesotho's Agriculture: A Review of
Existing Information. LASA Research Report No
. 2 . Ministry of Agriculture
Lesotho, 1978.
present a severe limitations to crop growth especially in the south.
Extremes of temperatures are further problems for crops. The excessive
summer heat has been established as a cause of severe plant stress and
damage especially in dry years.
Partly because of agronomic and ecologic factors and partly because
of other constraints faced by farmers, the farming practices of most
farmers are very far removed from those designed to achieve good crop
yields and increased long run productivity. Drought, frost, and hail are
among the major risk factors in crop production. Other causes of crop
failure include insects and pests.
The main source of growth in Lesotho's economy has been an increase
in migrant remittances and mine wages. Over half of Lesotho's able bodied
men between the ages of 20 and 45 are employed in South African mines,
bringing into Lesotho earnings amounting to some M48 million in the form
of deferred payments and M252 million as remittances^. The unique feature
of Lesotho' s economy is Chat over half of the GNP arises from migrant
worker sources
.
The majority of the migrant workers are from the rural households.
According to a study undertaken by the National University of Lesotho
(NUL)
,
96 percent^ of the migrants surveyed in 1977 were male and 4 percent
Ministry of Planning Economic and Manpower Development - Fourth Five
Year Development Plan - Maseru Lesotho. 1988.
Deferred payments- compulsory deposits into Lesotho Bank from mine wages
which may be withdrawn by miners after contracts are completed.
Remittances- Monthly wages received by miners.
^JASPA Employment Advisory Mission- Options for a Dependent Economy.
Development
.
Employment and Equity Problems in Lesotho
.
International
Labor Office. Addis Ababa 1979 p. 53.
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were female. Over 50 percent are under Che age of 40. The NUL study
reported that Forty- seven percent of the migrants had never attended
school (table 3)
.
Table 3: Basotho Migrants by Level of Education Attainment, 1977
Levels Percentage
No schooling 47
Standard 1 or 2 7
Standard 3 5
Standard 4 7
Standard 5 16
Standard 6 6
Standard 7 5
Form A or B 3
Junior Certificate 1
Unstated 3
TOTAL 100
Source; JASPA Employment Advisory Mission - Options for a
Dependent Economy, Development, Employment and Equity
Problems in lesotho. 1979.
It is evident from the above statistics that a high level of education is
not a requirement for employment In the South African mines. The Republic
of South Africa (RSA) attracts the less educated while the more educated
are likely to find employment in Lesotho.
There is strong argument In Lesotho that migration to the mines is
the source of low agricultural productivity. It is still very doubtful
according to other analysts whether migration causes low agricultural
productivity or low productivity causes people to move out of agriculture
to better paying mine labor. There is an argument that increasing wage
opportunities can lead to reduced farm productivity per hectare. The
substantial rise in mine wage earnings since the mid-1970s (table 4)
resulted in a decline in the proportion of household income contributed
by agriculture from 41 percent in 1967-69 to 18 percent in 1975^.
Table 4. Mine wage Employment and Income Outside Lesotho.
Mine Employment Deferred-fRemittance Income/worker
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
(Number) ('000 Maloti) ('000 Maloti)
87384 4438 51
91080 4708 52
110477 4818 49
110477 8643 78
106231 12463 117
112507 19995 178
121062 26062 215
127941 27605 216
124491 33268 267
124393 38137 307
120733 42123 349
123539 62741 508
117462 127724 1087
115320 177763 1541
114071 206474 1810
116513 235374 2020
Source: Labor Department - Maseru.
Agriculture's share of Gross National Product (GNP) decreased from
a high of 24.7 percent in 1973/74 to a low of 7.1 percent in 1983/84
(table 5). The share of Agriculture in GNP has been declining while the
share of remittances and mine wages has been increasing. During the period
1980/81 through 1984/85, an average annual domestic growth of -1.0 percent
'Low, Allan. Agricultural Development in Southern Africa: Farm
Household Economics and the Food Crisis. London, 1986.
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at 1984/85''^ prices was recorded. However the rapid annual growth of
migrant remittances was responsible for an overall positive GNP growth.
In 1970/71 agriculture's share of GNP was 22.4 percent and mine wages
were 20.8 percent. In 1984/85 mine wages contributed more than half of
Lesotho's GNP while agriculture's share was only 10.6 percent. Even though
the number of mine workers decreased from 1982 to 1985 the income from
the mine wages and remittances continued to grow indicating a steady
increase in wages and remittances per worker (table 4).
Table 5. Sector Distribution of GNP at factor Costs and Market Prices
Mine Agricul/
wages Cure
Manufac/
ture
Trade &
mining
Private Other
& govt
1970/71 20.8 22.4 2.8 16.7 22.2 15.1
1971/72 22.5 15.7 3.2 17.2 24.4 17.0
1972/73 23.2 21.8 2.9 14.1 22.3 15.7
1973/74 24.7 24.7 2.9 11.7 18.4 15.6
1974/75 30.5 20.1 3.0 11.9 17.6 17.6
1975/76 41.4 14.7 2.6 10.7 17.9 16.8
1976/77 40.7 18.4 2.3 10.1 16.7 12.7
1977/78 39.1 16.8 2.1 12.8 16.3 11.8
1978/79 35.5 17.0 2.5 13.3 17.1 13.3
1979/80 36.2 16.3 2.6 13.3 18.1 14.6
1980/81 39.8 11.5 2.7 13.5 21.2 10.8
1981/82 44.2 10.5 2.8 11.9 20.7 8.9
1982/83 51.6 9.0 3.1 11.1 16.9 7.6
1983/84 52.4 7.1 2.8 9.0 16.3 10.6
1984/85 51.2 10.6 2.7 6.8 16.5 12.2
Source: Lesotho Bureau of Statistics - Maseru 1984.
Ministry of Planning Economic and Manpower Development - Fourth Five
Year Development Plan (1986/87 - 1990/911. Lesotho. 1988
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CHAPTER III
CROP PRODUCTION IN LESOTHO
The five major crops grown in Lesotho in order of their
Importance are maize (corn), sorghum, wheat, beans and peas. Maize is the
main staple food. The Importance of maize as the main crop Is indicated
by the area planted to maize as a percentage of total arable land. Table
6 shows the area planted as a percentage of total arable land for maize,
sorghum, wheat, beans and peas from 1976/77 to 1985/86.
Area Planted and Harvested
Area planted to maize shows an upward trend from 1976/77 to 1985/86.
The area planted to maize Increased from 92,634 hectares in 1976/77 to
141,484 hectares in 1985/86. The area planted to the other crops shows a
somewhat variable pattern between 1976/77 to 1985/86. There is a vast
difference between the area planted and the area harvested for all the
crops shown In tables 7 and 8. It is assumed that area not harvested is
attributed to crop failure which may be due to drought, frost or other
causes of crop failure. The percent of area planted but not harvested
varies between 6 percent in 1977/78 and 19 percent in 1984/85.
The total area harvested from the five major crops also shows large
year to year variation over the period 1976/77 to 1985/86. The area
harvested has generally declined throughout the period. However, in
1983/84 and 1984/85 (except for peas) crop area harvested increased. Area
planted and harvested for some of the major crops is shown in tables 7
and 8.
Table 6: Area Planted as Percent of Total Arable Land.
Maize Sorghum Wheat Peas Others
1976/77 32 16 15 6 3 28
1977/78 38 21 16 5 2 18
1978/79 40 18 12 4 2 24
1979/80 40 22 10 3 2 23
1980/81 46 21 8 3 2 20
1981/82 43 20 8 6 4 19
1982/83 43 19 11 2 4 21
1983/84 46 21 11 4 3 15
1984/85 48 27 14 3 3 5
1985/86 49 20 9 6 2 14
Source: Ministry of Agriculture - Lesotho Agricultural Situation Report
1986 Edition
Table 7: Area Planted Major Crops
.
(1976/77 - 1985/86)
Maize Sorghum Wheat Beans Peas Total
(1000 hectares)
76/77
77/78
78/79
79/80
80/81
81/82
82/83
83/84
84/85
85/86
92 47 44 17 10 210
111 62 46 14 6 239
122 54 38 12 7 233
118 65 31 8 7 229
137 64 24 9 5 239
137 59 27 16 10 249
127 57 32 6 11 233
139 63 33 12 9 256
145 82 43 9 10 289
141 57 26 19 6 249
Source: Ministry of Agriculture - Lesotho Agricultural Situation Report
1986.
Table Area Harvested Major Crops (1916/71 - 1985/86)
Maize Sorghum Wheat Peas Total
(1000 hectares)
Ik/ll 80 42 42 15 7 186
n/i& 101 59 43 11 4 218
is/19 112 51 35 10 6 214
79/80 110 61 29 7 6 213
80/81 124 60 20 7 5 216
81/82 114 48 24 14 9 209
82/83 104 47 29 4 9 193
83/84 117 54 30 8 8 217
84/85 118 75 36 7 8 244
85/86 122 52 19 17 4 214
Source: Ministry of Agriculture - Lesotho Agricultural Situation Report
1986
Crop Production and Yields
Even though the area planted for the major crops especially maize
has been increasing, production of the major crops has declined especially
In the case of maize. In 1976/77 maize production was 126 thousand tons,
it increased to 143 thousand tons in the following cropping year
(1977/78). But production declined after 1977/78 to a low of 86 thousand
tons attained in 1985/86.
It has been suggested that the decline in production of the five
major crops from the mid 1970s into the early 1980s is in part due to the
rapid increase in mine employment and wages in South Africa'. The families
'Eckert J; Wykstra R.- South African Mine Wages and their Effects On
Lesotho' s Economy. Ministry of Agriculture Maseru. 1980.
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benefitting from mine employment are less dependent on farming as a means
of subsistence, and so have less incentive to farm. A recent recovery in
acreage may be due to reduction in migrant employment as well as increased
emphasis by the government on the Food Self - Sufficiency Program and other
programs designed to encourage food production.
Yields per hectare for maize and other crops have been declining
throughout the years. In 1976/77 the average yield for maize was 1359 kg
per hectare. In 1985/86 the maize yield had decreased by approximately
half and was only 611 kg per ha. Inter-seasonal variations in yields are
also weather related.
Table 9: Crop Production Major Food Crops (1976/77 - 1985/86)
Sorghum Wheat
(1000 tons)
76/77 126 62 61
77/78 143 86 58
78/79 125 69 34
79/80 106 59 28
80/81 106 48 17
81/82 83 26 15
82/83 76 31 15
83/84 79 34 17
84/85 92 55 18
85/86 86 33 11
21
11
8
4
4
5
2
1
3
4
Source: Ministry of Agriculture - Lesotho Agricultural Situation Report,
1986 Edition.
Analysis has been performed to determine the effect of rainfall on
maize yield. Yield and rainfall data from 1976/77 to 1985/86 have been
used. Maize yield is the seasonal average for the country, and rainfall
data is annual rainfall
.
Annual averages have been used for rainfall even though it is knovm
that critical periods for maize fall into different months in each season.
The critical times for maize growth is during tasseling and filling stages
which occur at 90 days and 130 days after planting. These critical periods
are determined when planting dates are known. But due to unavailability
of data pertaining to planting dates and other related data, only annual
rainfall is used. One other variable that could have been included in the
model is fertilizer as studies have indicated that fertilizer is an
important variable determining maize yields in Lesotho. However this also
could not be included for lack of appropriate data.
By using Least Squares Model a regression equation was calculated in
the following form:
Maize Yield = f( Annual Rainfall)
The results from the regression analysis were
:
R^ F Value
Yield = -532.0979 + 2.0462AR .5365 9.261
t value -1.173 3.043
* AR = Annual Rainfall in mm.
The R^ for this analysis is .5365, or 54 %. This is the proportion
of variation in maize yield that is explained by the regression, and the
equation is significant at the 95 "L level. Previous studies that used
tasseling rain and filling rain as variables in determining yield recorded
r2 of 96 % (Hesling 1984)
.
Even though both yield and rainfall data have discrepancies In that
18
yield varies among regions but seasonal averages have been used, and
rainfall only critical at certain stages of growth, this analysis does
indicate that rainfall is a factor in determining maize yield.
Table 10: Yield for Major Crops in Lesotho (1975/77 -1985/86)
Year Sorghum Wheat Beans Peas Rainfall
(Kg /Hectare) (mm)
76/77 1359 1331 1397 1207 724 805
77/78 1284 1383 1270 756 774 815
78/79 1020 1274 886 699 1035 621
79/80 892 919 920 439 687 679
80/81 774 749 722 383 587 793
81/82 608 446 534 294 429 663
82/83 601 539 465 255 298 550
83/84 537 540 511 115 410 603
84/85 637 672 427 250 535 511
85/86 611 585 423 203 259 628
Source: Ministry of Agriculture - Lesotho Agricultural Situation Report
1986.
A comparison of yield is made between Lesotho and one of the Provinces
in South Africa; the Orange Free State (OFS). The Orange Free State is
chosen because of its relative similarity to Lesotho by proximity and
climate
.
Lesotho's yields are much below those attained in the OFS. These two
locations had similar patterns of inter- seasonal variation from 1976/77
to 1979/80 when OFS experienced much more fluctuation in yield. OFS and
Leotho share similar climatic conditions, so if there is drought in the
OFS it will also occur in Lesotho, but because the OFS uses more advanced
farming practices the yields are still relatively higher.
19
Table 11: A Comparison of Trends in Maize Production
Lesotho, Orange Free State* and RSA
Lesotho OFS
(1000 tons)
125 3553
143 3474
125 3021
106 3414
105 5015
83 2766
76 1342
79 1295
92 2878
86 2645
RSA
1975/77
1977/78
1978/79
1979/80
1980/81
1881/82
1982/83
1983/84
1984/85
1885/86
9714
10055
8332
10762
14555
8359
4083
4393
7558
8077
* The Orange Free State (OFS) as a region of South Africa (RSA) was
selected for Its relative comparison to Lesotho by proximity and climate.
Source: Lesotho Agricultural Situation Report. 1986 Edition.
Table 12: Comparison of Maize Yields Lesotho and OFS
Years/Average Lesotho
1976/77
1977/78
1978/79
1979/80
1980/81
1981/82
1982/83
1983/84
1984/85
(Kg/hectare)
1359
1284
1020
892
774
508
573
637
611
2810
2395
2203
2067
2832
2156
849
2440
Source: Lesotho Agricultural Situation Report
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Lesotho Is unable to supply all it needs for domestic
consumption. Imports have become necessary to supplement domestic
production. Imports of food grains and pulses from both commercial and
donor sources are reported in Table 13. Commercial imports have stayed
somewhat constant, but total imports have increased indicating reliance
on donated food. Lesotho started to receive large quantities of food aid
in 1966^ to cope with a serious drought.
^David Jones- Aid and Development in Southern Africa
. British Aid to
Botswana Lesotho and Swaziland. London, 1977 p . 204
.
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Table 13: Imports of Major Crops (whole grain)
Years Wheat Sorghu Pulses
1977/78 82.0
1978/79 91.3
1979/80 91.0
1980/81 105.7
1981/82 117.0
1982/83 99.2
1983/84 103.9
1984/85 108.8
1985/86 117.3
1986/87 112.9
(1000 tons)
36.8 1.9
32.1 1.8
38.4 1.4
37.7 1.0
30.3 1.7
33.8 3.3
52.4 1.3
58.6 1.0
62.7 1.0
63.0 1.0
0.8
0.8
1.2
1.0
1.2
1.3
1.8
1.8
2.3
2.3
Sources: Ministry of Agriculture - Lesotho Agricultural Situation Report
1986 Edition.
The widening food production-consumption gap together with government
desires to feed adequately the growing urban population, have led to
increasing quantities of imports in many countries. One of the
consequences of the food production-consumption gap and increase in urban
population has been an increase in the price of food relative to the
overall cost of living.
Degree of national self-sufficiency for maize, sorghum, and wheat for
the period 1978 through 1986 are shown in table 14. The percent self-
sufficiency figures are calculated by dividing total domestic production
by the total imports plus domestic production. For maize and wheat, the
self-sufficiency percentages in the 1980s are lower than in the late
1970s. Sorghum has attained much higher and fairly constant self-
sufficiency percentage and is approaching total self sufficiency. From
1977/78 to 1986/87 there were no sorghum donations received by Lesotho.
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Table 14: Self-sufficiency for Three Major Crops 1978/79 - 1986/87
Crop 78/79 79/80 80/81 81/82 82/83 83/84 84/85 85/86 86/87
Maize 61.1
Wheat 64.3
Sorghum 97 .
9
57.9
46.7
98.0
50.0
42.8
98.3
47.5
35.9
96.6
45.6
30.0
88.7
42.3
22.0
95.5
42
22
97
.2
.6
.1
44.1
22.7
98.2
43.4
14.9
97.1
Source: Ministry of Agriculture - Lesotho Agricultural Situation Report,
1986 Edition.
CHAPTER IV
PRODUCER INCENTIVES IN LDCs
Many national governments use incentives to boost agricultural
production. Incentive programs are designed to meet each country's needs
and policies, but the common aim is to enhance agricultural productivity.
In many countries more than one incentive method or approach is used. A
combination of incentives may include the improvement of credit
facilities, availability of agricultural inputs, and introduction of new
technologies in farming.
In the Philippines 'Masagana 99 Program'^, a package of technology
under a supervised rice program was put into place. A credit scheme was
instituted to provide loans at low interest rates without collateral.
Hundreds of rural banks with branches administered credit to the farmers,
lending money after the spot processing of farmers' applications,
eliminating long waiting time between the farmer application and approval
of such an application.
At the same time a fertilizer subsidy was implemented to offset the
high fertilizer prices
.
A price support program for rice was also
implemented to guarantee farmers a floor price for their paddy thereby
stabilizing price and assuring a reasonable profit for the farmers.
Fertilizer was found to be the most significant factor which affected
paddy production. Participants in the program earned 55 to 75 percent
^Alix, Jesus - The Impact of the Masagana 99 Program on Small Farmer
Production and Income in the Phllliplnes
.
Ministry of Agriculture.
Research Report No. 11, 1978
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more than non- participants because of increased yields . The use of
subsidies is common as an encouragement to use a particular input like
fertilizer
.
Many programs to boost production entail subsidized financial credit.
It is common for such national programs to suffer from low loan recovery
rates which sometimes leads to more restrained lending policies. Non-
repayment of loans results in such farmers or groups of farmers being
excluded from further participation in the credit program. One of the
reasons cited for non-repayment of loans was the non-collateral nature of
the loans. Poor supervision of the banks and widespread corruption in
handling government monies are some of the reasons for default.
Because of the economic and political importance of agricultural and
food sectors, governments usually manipulate agricultural and food prices
to achieve production and food supply goals. Manipulation of price and
income variables is one of the major policy instruments available for
stimulating output and achieving many other policy objectives. Food policy
objectives may include:
1. Encouraging food production in order to achieve self-
sufficiency, more especially in staple food.
2. Stabilizing prices to agricultural producers.
3
.
Raising rural incomes and,
4. Stabilizing food prices to urban consumers and restricting
price increases
.
Implementation of price and income policies, more often than not,
results in conflicts among different objectives. Governments have to deal
with problems of inconsistencies arising from conflicting objectives. To
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set an example; any marked increase in the price of food to encourage
production or raise rural incomes will have a significant effect on low
income people, as well as on urban workers' standard of living. The
impacts may lead to demands for higher wages and hence create inflationary
pressures on the economy. Dharam Ghai and Lawrence Smith^ report that
because agricultural and food sectors are so important in the economies
of Sub-Saharan Africa
,
governments in this area attempt to intervene in
the agricultural and food pricing system
.
However, they express some doubts concerning the effectiveness of
the pricing mechanism and suggest that inadequate incentives are a prime
reason for the poor agricultural performance in Sub-Saharan Africa. Price
adjustments are a maj or way of providing economic incentives , but
incentive programs do not work because of failure to recognize that actual
production decisions are influenced not only by absolute price changes but
by relative changes in the prices of different commodities.
One of the difficulties faced with observing a positive correlation
between an increased price of a commodity and its output is the length of
many agricultural production processes. Ghai mentions that there is a
tendency for farm households to attempt to be self-sufficient in basic
food requirements even when cash crops can be produced and sold. It is
suggested that maybe a certain degree of satisfaction is obtained from
self-sufficiency which causes farmers with a self-sufficiency objective
not to react or react very slowly to changes in prices of food crops. In
^Ghai, Dhuram and Smith, Lawrence - Agricultural Prices. Policy, and
Equity In Sub-Saharan Africa. Lynn Rienner Publishers
, Inc . Boulder
,
Colorado. 1987.
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Lesotho maize which is a subsistence crop occupies a much larger
cultivated area than beans which is considered a cash crop even though
the price of a kilogram of beans Is worth three to four times that of
maize
,
Since relative prices not absolute prices are important in
harmonizing the pricing system, government systems responsible for setting
different prices need to be coordinated to effectively implement pricing
of different commodities.
In Pakistan both agricultural output and input prices have been major
instruments of government policy"'" , The government intervened in
agriculture through taxes and financial subsidies. The decline in
international prices for Pakistan' s maj or exports and need to protect
agricultural producers led to the removal of export taxes in 1978. There
was virtually no direct tax on agricultural incomes. Subsidies for the
import of fertilizers and for use of pesticides and herbicides were the
major subsidies given to agriculture
.
Unlike higher commodity prices, it is argued that subsidies do not
raise directly food and raw material prices paid by urban consumers.
Subsidies also ensure that the benefits of government expenditures accrue
only to cultivators using off-farm inputs to expand production. However
it has been observed that in some countries where fertilizer is subsidized
for use on particular crops, farmers may sell a fertilizer quota to
another farmer at less than the market price. It should be born in mind
that subsidies are not without a cost to the government administering
^Cheong, Kee-Cheok; Emmanuel H. D'silva - Prices. Terms of Trade and
The role of Government in Pakistan's Agriculture. IBRD, 1984.
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them. Subsidies are a burden on scarce public resources.
Implementing a subsidy policy involves a lot of administrative effort
and monitoring. For instance, in Pakistan farmers on irrigated land were
exempted from land taxation if their holdings were less than 11 acres.
Farmers with holdings between 25 and 50 acres had assessment rates of 50
percent. Those with more than 50 acres had rates of 100 percent. In such
a case, apart from the cost of subsidies to the government, high costs are
incurred in administering the program in terms of staffing and other
related activities.
It is noted that in both Taiwan and Japan""^ where considerable success
has been attained in promoting agricultural development and where the use
of fertilizer has risen to high levels, there are also effective price
policies for agricultural products. In Japan the farmer is paid a
considerably higher price than the rice consumers have to pay in the
market
.
According to Schultz^, the man who farms as his forefathers did
cannot produce much food no matter how rich the land or how hard he works.
The farmer who has access to and knows how to use what science knows about
soils, plants, animals and machines can produce an abundance of food
though the land is poor. Schultz says that the knowledge that makes this
transformation from traditional agriculture to modern agriculture possible
is a form of capital, which may be part of the inputs farmers use or part
^Organization for Economic Co-Operation and Development - Supply and
Demand Prospects for fertilizers in Developing Countries. Development
Center for OECD.
^Schultz T.W. Transforming Traditional Agriculture. Yale University
1964.
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of their skills.
The implication is that a country that depends on 'traditional
agriculture'; that is, farming based upon the kinds of practices and
factors of production that have been used by farmers for generations will
remain poor, and asserts that transformation of agriculture is dependent
on investment in both human and material capital
.
However , in many
countries supply of capital is not usually the problem, the problem is
basically determining the forms of investment that will make such
investment in agriculture profitable
.
In determining the opportunities in agriculture , it is proper to
consider which agricultural factors of production are primarily
responsible for the large differences in production among countries. In
some cases the differences in land quality are of little importance, but
differences in quality of production capital are of substantial
importance. Differences in capabilities of farm people are the most
important factors determining levels of agricultural production. Perhaps
this will help to explain the vast differences in agricultural output and
productivity in a comparison made earlier between Lesotho and the Orange
Free State
.
The human agent and the differences in level of acquired
capabilities of farm people are the key variable in explaining the
differences in agricultural production among countries and individuals.
Agricultural development and economic growth in poor countries
depends primarily upon availability of factors of production, and the
price of modern agricultural factors.-^ The suppliers of the factors of
^Schultz T.W - Transforming Traditional Agriculture. Yale University
Press 1964
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production play a key role in agricultural growth and development, because
when they succeed in producing and distributing these factors cheaply,
investment in agriculture therefore becomes profitable. Hence, development
of institutions that provide credit for financing investment in such
factors is critical.
Policy making can be viewed as the outcome of a process of
reconciliation of conflict between divergent individual and group
interests
.
It is the understanding of consequences more than anything
else that is critical to wise public policy decision making.
Bad and inappropriate policy in some countries has resulted in
decline in agricultural production, while appropriate and adequate policy
measures may lead to a maj or agrarian success
.
Tanzania's agrarian decline during the two decades from the mid-
1960s to the mid-1980s provides a near perfect illustration of the cause
and effect relationship between inappropriate agricultural policy and poor
economic performance^. Tanzania's agrarian decline was a result of policy
to attempt to impose a socialist framework on the country's rural areas,
by replacing the existing patterns of individualized household production
with a network of village communities in which land would be collectively
held and production collectively organized, by moving farmers to new
locations, and its persistent implementation of policies that discouraged
agricultural production.
^Petit Michel- Agricultural Policy Formation in the European
Community. Elsevier Science Publishers B.V. The Netherlands, 1987.
^Lofchie Michael F. - The Policy Factor. Agricultural Performance in
Kenya and Tanzania. Lynn Rennier Publishers, Inc. 1989. p . 108
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The goverrraient of Tanzania strictly regulates the producer prices
of all of the country's major crops. The tendency has been to set prices
at levels that have, over time, sharply reduced the purchasing power of
farmers incomes. One factor was that imported agricultural inputs almost
always were in short supply, and resulted in their being generally
obtainable only at highly inflated prices. This is consistent with a
belief by some authors that African governments have adopted a set of
economic policies that effectively reduce economic rewards to small-scale
producers, and increasing the prices they pay for goods they purchase
being both production inputs and consumer items. In sum, Tanzania's system
of governmental ly administered producer prices bears a heavy
responsibility for the agrarian crisis.
Kenya on the other hand is an agrarian success story, and
demonstrates the opposite of Tanzania's case. Kenya demonstrated very well
how policies favorable to the agricultural sector can help stimulate its
rapid development. Kenya totally features one of the most advanced and
complex agricultural sectors of any independent Sub-Saharan country. Its
agricultural GDP grew at a rate of more than 4.5 percent per annum during
decades following independence.
Kenya implemented a set of agricultural policies that development
experts termed soft options, as well as hard options. One of the soft
options was to expand the land area under cultivation in the country's
high- and medium-potential regions by purchasing large scale settler farms
and distributed them to African small holders. Another approach was the
elimination of restrictions on African cash cropping. Prior to this,
Africans were forbidden by law to cultivate coffee or tea. A third major
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source of agricultural growth was the introduction of scientifically
advanced methods of production which dramatically increased production
and yields. During the twenty year period from 1955 to 1975 tea and coffee
yields doubled, while wheat output also doubled.
The hard options included land policy, pricing policy, exchange rate
policy and administering of agricultural parastatals. Under pricing
policy , the government maintained a pattern of commodity pricing that
provides adequate incentives for agricultural producers. For export crops,
the world market prices of coffee and tea are simply passed on to the
producers
.
In the previous discussion, policy issues have been discussed and
without exception, all have been implemented or instituted by respective
governments
. An appropriate question to ask is why government becomes
involved in agricultural programs. The specific reasons for government
involvement in agriculture have changed as the nature of the farm problem
and the overall political, social, and economic environment change. Some
major reasons for government involvement in agriculture are
;
1. Low farm income has traditionally been the major justification
for programs that support farm prices and incomes,
2. The need to stabilize farm prices,
3
.
The importance of adequate supply of food, and
4 Protecting the capacity of agriculture to produce in future
generations by conserving the soil
.
Food and agricultural problem can no longer be specified in simple
terms such as low prices and incomes . Instead there are several problems
including world food problems, the farm problem, the consumer food problem
32
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and resource problem' . The extent of these problems calls for strong
coordinated and appropriate government policy.
^Knutson R.D; Penn J.B; Boehm W.L - Agricultural and Food Policy.
Prentice Hall New Jersey, 1983.
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CHAPTER V
SELECTED GOVERNMENT PROGRAMS AND INCENTIVES
IN LESOTHO
Lesotho's agricultural sector faces severe constraints and
intractable problems of productivity and development. It must be
recognized that agriculture is the overwhelmingly dominant activity of
the domestic economy, and that the ultimate solution of the country's
economic problems lies in its vigorous development. The question of
declining agricultural productivity in Lesotho raises a lot of concern
both for the government and the policy makers
. It is not surprising
therefore that the government engaged in many activities whose purpose
was to improve and increase agricultural productivity.
Agriculture's low productivity and slow growth are related to a range
of ecologic , economic , and cultural factors that are in most cases very
complex
.
In this chapter , the government ' s participation in promotional
activities for agriculture will be discussed and evaluated.
A. COOPERATIVE CROP PRODUCTION PROGRAM (CCPP)
Government policy has been directed toward increasing availability of
non- traditional inputs for producers and toward improving product markets.
Initial direct participation in agriculture by the government started in
1976 with the launching of the Cooperative Crop Production Program (CCPP)
.
In this program the government took complete control of management and
operation of agricultural activities under the program.
The main obj ectives of the program were to achieve self-sufficiency
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in basic food grains such as wheat and maize, and to stimulate local
employment opportunities
. The aim was to use improved methods of
cultivation by use of tractors and use of fertilizer and improved seed,
as well as timely planting of the crops.
Procedure
.
The intentions of the government were announced and explained to the
farmers whose locations were to be included in the program. The program
covered the lowland areas of the country, stretching from north to south.
Locations included in the program had to be accessible by road for
delivery of inputs and for tractor operations
.
All fields were measured. A minimum of 1.5 acres had to be met for
a field to be included in the program. Farmers intending to join the
program registered their names with the local extension agent and had to
sign contract forms between government and individual farmers, which
confirmed ownership of the land and stated conditions of sharing of the
crop after harvest.
The costs of CCPP operation were entirely borne by the government. The
important economic difference between the traditional share-cropping
system and CCPP was that neither the landholders nor the cultivator were
to lose if the enterprise failed since the full cost of the cropping
operations were borne by the government. The farmers contributed virtually
nothing except their lands.
The government on the other hand supplied all inputs of seed,
fertilizers and tractors for all field operations. Both government and
privately owned tractors were used for ploughing discing and planting. If
for any reason the crop was a failure, the farmers were guaranteed a
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certain amount on a per acre basis. All the risk, all the costs and all
the losses were borne entirely by the government. After harvest the crop
was divided between the individual farmers and the government.
Under these circumstances then it is understandable that landholders
were very keen to have their land included in Che program. The farmers
realized that substantial incomes could be made without expenditure, risk
or commitment of labor. The number of landholders wanting to be included
in the scheme greatly exceeded the capacity of the Ministry of Agriculture
program.
Funding of the program.
The initial financing of CCPP was from the Deferred Pay Fund in which
migrant miners earnings were held until their return home. This was a loan
from Lesotho Bank for the initial amount of Ml . 2 million followed by a
second loan of M2 . million, on the assumption that the scheme would be
self -financing thereafter. Self -financing was not realized however, and
government appropriations were necessary to finance the losses. Unlike
other programs or projects, CCPP did not provide any credit to the
farmers, but credit was extended directly to the government.
Evaluation of the program.
Quantitative estimates of CCPP's performance present difficulties
because of the virtual absence of proper records. It was estimated by the
Ministry of Finance that in the Potato Program 88 percent of the funds
invested were lost, in the Sunflower Program 47 percent were lost, in the
Teff Program 91 percent were lost.
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The operations of CCPP appear Co have experienced a lot of technical,
institutional and management problems. In the Potato Program, equipment,
coordination and timing problems led to the rotting of most of the seed.
Lack of storage for both seed and harvested crops, and transportation and
commercial deficiencies meant that marketing and not the markets became
the bottleneck
.
Some of the major problems regarding CCPP were the misallocation of
seed and fertilizers and improper and inconsistent measurements of acreage
supposedly cultivated by the tractor contractor. But most of all, the
apparently inadequate managerial ability of the staff of CCPP led to the
program failure.
Even though CCPP was a costly program, participating landholders were
able to realize levels of income well above the average of their
community. Also, the amount of land put under cultivation increased
because even the poor landholders were able to use their lands which they
otherwise would not. Increases in area planted and accompanying increases
in wheat production were attributed to CCPP in 1976/77 to 1977/78. The
winter wheat program proved to be beneficial to the farmers, but the
benefits came at high expense to the government.
An economic analysis report of CCPP justified the program by stating
that it was not intended to make any profit and the government was
expected to make a financial loss as the program had to serve mainly as
a demonstration to farmers to show the agricultural potential of their
land. However CCPP received a lot of criticism from other organizations
and individuals, because the program did everything and nothing was
required of the producers. The program ended in 1979,
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B. DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS I973-I983
In many agricultural societies, the availability of producer services
is a fundamental problem. The absence of many producer services to farmers
has been recognized as a significant reason for the continuing subsistence
orientation and low productivity of farmers in many countries including
Lesotho. It is common for extension service to teach farmers about the use
of fertilizers and improved seed as well as insecticides which are at the
same time not available to the farmer. This is one case where extension
work becomes meaningless and ineffective . To remedy low agricultural
productivity, the government instituted individual area based projects
such as the Senqu River Agricultural Extension Project based in the
southern part of the country, the Thaba-Bosiu Rural Development Project
covering parts of Maseru and Berea districts, Khomo-khoana Rural
Development Project in the northern part of the country and the Basic
Agricultural Services Project (BASP) which covered a wider area than the
other three, for it included the northern districts, central districts and
the southern districts of the country.
Funding and administration of the projects.
All of these projects were heavily financed by foreign aid. They were
run under isolated and substantially independent management and they had
tended to be separated from the general process of the government.
General objectives
.
Most of the activities of these projects included provision of credit
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to the farmers, procurement of agricultural inputs, setting up of
demonstration plots and improving the extension service by hiring more
extension staff to cover more farmers. BASF attempted to avoid the
unsustainability and isolation of the more conventionally defined
proj ects
.
It was designed to support a program of improved services to
farm producers across the foothills and lowland agricultural areas of the
country. Since its inception BASF was clearly a vehicle for enhancing or
creating capacity to serve large numbers of farmers with development
services designed to increase their commercialization and productivity
.
The intention was furthermore that this capacity be created on a
sustainable basis within the government whose staffing and expertise would
be expanded accordingly.
BASF was concerned with physical infrastructure to the extent of 1000
kilometers of feeder roads and warehouses for both farm supplies and
produce marketing. It also took charge of institutional infrastructure in
areas of improved marketing, credit and extension services to the farmer.
Thaba-Bosiu Froject which became effective in 1973 was intended to
assist some 12,000 farmers in the lowlands and foothills south and east
of Maseru. Some of its main objectives were:
1) To quadruple the yield per unit area of maize, sorghum, wheat and
beans through provision of fertilizer and seed on credit, and
improved extension services and technical assistance to
contractors
.
2) To establish market and input supply points;
3) To conduct agricultural research at a sub-station in the project
area and;
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4) To construct feeder roads
.
Evaluation of the projects.
The objectives of these area based proj ects were usually met , but
only for a short time when foreign agencies were still in operation.
Inputs were brought c loser to the farmers , credit was extended and
extension agents were provided. In many cases, the projects operated what
was called Village Distribution Points, where fertilizers and seeds could
be bought within the village or at least within walking distance.
But the biggest problem arose when support of the projects phased
out and everything that the project had started and had operated collapsed
as the proj ect ' s funds were pulled out . The repeated experience is that
within a short time of the project termination, little remains . In some
cases the main remnants are the unpaid debts of those local people who
have participated in the credit program and have been unable or unwilling
to repay their loans
,
However according to a study in the area where Senqu River
Agricultural Project was concentrated, 48 households which were surveyed
and were considered 'better' farmers by other villagers produced nearly
five times the output value , sold nearly 17 times as much and consumed
and stored about three times as much as the average of a random sample of
ordinary farmers. These results came through the use of better seedbed
preparation, more appropriate timing, improved seed, and a combination of
fertilizers and pest and disease control practices. A summary of a rural
survey of three years findings from Khomo-khoana Rural Development Project
stated that contrary to the obj ectives of the project to encourage
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production of cash crops in the area, the proportion of land planted to
food crops (maize and sorghum) , increased sharply to 65 percent in 1975/77
from 50 percent in 1975/76 and 37 percent in 1974/75. On the other hand
the area under cash crops fell to 16 percent from 35 percent in the
previous year. This swing was believed to have been due to unavailability
of markets
.
According to the World Bank report, the project had adequate
financial support, recruited a capable international management team, and
attracted good local staff. The project established an efficient network
of supply points throughout the area, increased the use of inputs, ran an
effective credit program and completed its road building program.
Fertilizer and seed sales increased substantially during early phases of
the project and 75 percent of these were sold for cash. But, of much
significance was the failure of inputs to produce the yield increases that
had been anticipated.
Low (1986) states that in Lesotho a review of seven separate
agricultural development programs between 1953 and 1980 leads to the
conclusion that after 20 years of experimentation with intensive area
based projects, there is little improvement in production that can be
attributed to them.
All in all, the results of most if not all area based projects are
visible only as long as the project is in operation. The projects are not
designed in such a way that the farmers would continue the activities
after the project's termination. The common criticism or reason for
discontinued activities after the projects are phased out is that all of
these projects are heavily supported by foreign funds which neither the
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farmer nor the government can afford to continue. This usually results in
closure of input distribution centers, unavailability of credit, as well
as tractors for field operations.
C. AGRICULTURAL MARKETING
Food and agricultural marketing means the movement of agricultural
products from the farmer to the consumer or processor. There are many
important stages through which agricultural produce has to go in order to
reach the final destination which is the consumer. The marketing process
includes physical handling and transportation, initial processing and
packaging to simplify handling and reduce wastage, grading and quality
control to simplify sales and transactions and to meet different consumer
requirements
.
For the farmer
, the strategic function of a marketing system is to
offer a convenient and economically efficient outlet for his produce. This
is vital to the producer especially one who is market oriented because no
product should ever be produced unless it has a market, hence marketing
begins at the farm. To the consumer of agricultural products, assurance
of a steady supply at lowest possible cost is the vital service. Through
negotiations in the marketing process, prices are determined that balance
the consumer's ability to pay with the farmers 's need for an incentive to
produce
.
Agricultural marketing also includes the marketing of agricultural
supplies or inputs to the farmer. Supplies include machinery, fertilizers,
pesticides and other chemicals needed in crop production. Through all the
stages of marketing, financing is an essential ingredient.
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While growing awareness of marketing as a concept and vital element
in the economy has occurred, the problems associated with marketing of
agricultural products have also been identified. What constitutes an
improvement in marketing is not obvious. The area of marketing in many
countries is very complex and difficult. It is also very political on
international, national and local levels.
One of the questions facing administrators is whether the marketing
enterprises should be in private, cooperative, or public ownership. In
many countries there is no department specifically responsible for
advising on agricultural marketing policy, or for conducting research in
this field. Lack of awareness of the importance of marketing is reflected
when development strategies do not include consideration of marketing
functions. A 1970-^ review of government attitudes toward marketing in Asia
showed that agricultural marketing was a field about which most government
officials knew very little
.
Major decisions were often taken without
adequate information concerning likely impacts on markets and marketing.
Lack of qualified personnel is a major constraint in marketing
development. It is sometimes claimed that with adequate training of people
concerned, most improvement problems would solve themselves. Unfortunately
in some countries this is not a priority, hence the increase in problems
of agricultural marketing.
In order for farmers to produce more to meet first the consumption
requirements of a country, incentives are needed to motivate them. How to
Abbott, J. C. - Marketing Improvement in the Developing World: What
happens and what we have learned. FAO Marketing and Credit Service Rome
1986.
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provide adequate price incentives for production, yet keep retail prices
of essential foods within reach of the poorer consumers is a critical
issue facing many developing countries. If an attempt is made to keep down
prices paid to farmers, the effect of such a practice is to discourage
production by the farmers.
The theoretical role of prices in a fully integrated market economy
is well known. First, prices determine the barter terms of trade on which
goods
, services and resources can be exchanged for each other . Secondly
prices of final goods and services determine the profitability of any
production process and hence determine producers money income. Prices are
therefore a form of communication signals that serve to coordinate market
decisions-^. Many governments usually intervene by trying to manipulate
prices for specific reasons pertaining to their countries. The methods
used also differ according to the type of situation in a particular
country or region. Problems of establishing effective markets are
aggravated by the substantial proportion of agricultural products that are
not traded and the many markets that are extremely fragmented as is the
case in Lesotho.
As it might also be expected, the government of Lesotho established
marketing enterprises to enable the farmers to have an outlet for their
produce. Until 1974 commercial buying and selling of grains and pulses
was conducted by licensed private traders
. The traders set their own
prices without government regulation until 1973 when the government began
to set prices for maize and sorghum. In 1975, the Produce Marketing
^Kohl R; Uhl J.- Marketing of agricultural Products. Macmillan
Publishing company. 1985.
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Corporation (PMC) a parastatal body, took over the marketing of grains and
pulses, and private traders were no longer allowed to trade in these items
except as agents for PMC. The primary justification for replacing the
private traders by PMC was to protect the farmers. The private traders
were accused of purchasing from farmers at prices well below the levels
that would have been dictated by competitive markets, and selling back to
them at prices above what was necessary to cover the costs of
transportation, storage and finance. However analysis had shown that this
practice of paying unfair prices was concentrated among a few traders, and
that most traded at prices dictated by existing market conditions.
From 1975 on, producer prices were set by the government. PMC was
given complete control of marketing of the country's major food crops. It
was also the principal agent for fertilizers and other agricultural
supplies
.
The gazetted prices were usually set somewhat above the import
parity level with the nearby markets in Republic of South Africa (RSA)
,
but not so high as to encourage illegal imports of lower priced RSA
products to be sold at Lesotho's supported prices.
The main objective of that pricing policy was to support and
encourage domestic production as much as possible. The policy was further
reinforced by the fact that corresponding RSA prices were also set well
above world prices.
However the pricing procedure, caused problems for PMC and led to
its insolvency as a result of determined prices that were inconsistent
with its financial viability because PMC was not given the authority to
set prices in a competitive fashion. In view of the corporation's
inability to buy the farmers grain output, farmers reverted to an
45
increasing subsistence stance, and virtually all grain except that grown
on government schemes went through informal village marketing channels,
which appeared to have responded well.
It was estimated that the non- government wheat crop declined in 1978,
The decline was attributed to the fact that wheat is generally marketed
commercially and farmers had on the basis of their experience, lost
confidence in the ability of the government marketing system to take their
crop when they want to sell it and to pay them in some reasonable way. The
inability of PMC to purchase farmers crops was a consequence of its
inability to acquire the necessary working capital or facilities for grain
drying and long term storage. It is evident that the scope for successful
price fixing and the intervention of government or parastatal agency such
as PMC, in the marketing context of Lesotho was limited at that time.
Because of the failure of past marketing institutions, the government
practice has been to directly establish marketing institutions, in many
cases with donor support. As a result, there are a number of major
marketing institutions established to assure outlet for agricultural
commodities. The manner in which these institutions are organized as legal
entities and the degree of government involvement vary among them.
Some of the principal marketing institutions dealing with inputs and
crop output marketing include:
1) Lesotho Flour Mills; Lesotho Maize Mill
2) Lesotho Milling Company
3) Co-Op Lesotho
4) Basotho Canners
5) Agrivet (Private)
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These institutions may be considered the formal market for
agricultural commodities. Even though they are not all profitable and
self-sustaining, they do provide established market outlet for
agricultural commodities and input supplies
.
Financial failure caused dissolution of PMC. After PMC was dissolved
the present Co-Op Lesotho was set up in 1981 as a result of government
decision to merge PMC with Co-Op Lesotho. The purpose of the merger was
to make more efficient the farm input supply and crop marketing
operations
,
Initially Co-Op Lesotho had planned to operate 16 commercially viable
depots, but by March 1981 it had 38 locations. By March 1983 the number
of outlets had grown to 58 and has since declined gradually to 39 depots.
The major activities of Co-Op Lesotho are crop input supply and crop
commodity marketing. Roy Wiebe""^ mentions in his evaluation of the input
supply system in Lesotho that the lack of working capital, detailed
accounting control records, and poorly trained staff are some of the
problems facing Co-Op Lesotho. The serious problems raise questions of
compatibility combining commercial profitable operations with those of
uneconomical remote location with low throughput. It is suggested that a
reorganization of the input distribution and commodity marketing be
instituted to more efficiently operate these activities. Presently Co -
Op Lesotho is still the major distributor of farm inputs and the major
buyer of farm produce
.
Wiebe
,
Roy - Lesotho Farm Input Supply System. Ministry of
Agriculture , Lesotho . 1987
.
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D. FERTILIZER PROGRAM
Fertilizers have a key role to play in increasing agricultural
production
.
But conditions exist under which fertilizer consumption can
be expected to develop. All of the conditions that will be mentioned
below are not sufficient in themselves to bring about a spread in
fertilizer use, but each of these conditions is necessary for successful
fertilizer promotion.
1. sound economic incentive for farmers to use fertilizer;
2. the availability of agricultural research results and an adequate
agricultural extension service to make results known to the
farmer
;
3
.
adequate financial credit
;
4. availability of fertilizer supplies in the right combinations,
at the right place and at the right time
.
One factor is paramount for any successful effort to promote the use
of fertilizer, and that is the motivation of the farmers to obtain
additional income. If the farmers are not motivated by incentives that
they can visualize or see, then they might be reluctant to use fertilizer.
The fertilizer Program in Lesotho was initiated in 1969. The first
phase of the project consisted of:
1. A large number of demonstrations on farmers fields to determine
the right kinds of fertilizer and optimum rates of
application
.
2. A smaller number of more precise trials also on farmers fields to
determine the most efficient fertilizer use.
3
.
The development of a soil testing service based on the results
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obtained in the field and laboratory.
4. Assistance in the training of personnel in the techniques of
trials, demonstrations and soil analysis.
The design used in demonstrations was a simple one intended to
demonstrate the effect of fertilizers in general and to obtain some
information regarding the relative effects of the three major nutrients,
N,P,K.
Of the 357 demonstrations planned in 1969/70, 257 were actually set
out. But because of the drought that occurred In mid- season, about 80
percent of the demonstrations were lost. Useful results were obtained from
only 29 demonstrations with maize and 15 with sorghum.
Working together with the Agricultural Experiment station, the
Fertilizer Program staff ran experiments on different crop responses to
fertilizers on different soil types.
To date, as mentioned before, fertilizers are broadly adopted in
Lesotho and quantity of fertilizer use is Increasing (table 15). But the
main question is whether fertilizer is being used or applied adequately
to attain expected yield from crops.
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Table 15: Fertilizer use In Lesotho (1975/76 to 1984/85)
Fertilizer Nutrients Nutrient/Ha Planted
(Ions)
1975/76
1976/77
1977/78
1978/79
1979/80
1980/81
1981/82
1982/83
1983/84
1984/85
3840
5937
7944
6479
9880
9498
9115
8543
11596
10960
507
1139
1228
1017
1925
1920
1914
2564
2316
2474
(Kgs)
1.488
5,222
5.040
4.242
8.113
7.582
7.672
10.990
12.603
8.541
Source: Ministry of Agriculture - Agricultural Situation Report 1986.
The economic incentive for the farmer to use fertilizers will depend
on the relation between the price of fertilizer delivered to him, the
additional yield that he can obtain from their application, and the
additional income that he will get from the production Increase'. The
first and the last of these three factors can be directly Influenced by
governmental action, while yield response depends on a variety of factors
such as soils, climate and weather conditions, cultivation practices , crop
varieties and other inputs like seeds and pesticides.
The price that the farmer pays for fertilizer is of crucial
importance in determining the economic Incentive he has to apply
fertilizer. Fertilizers have been subsidized for a long period in Lesotho.
Organization for Economic Co-Operation and Development. - Supply and
Demand Prospect s for Fertilizers in Developing Countries. Development
Center for OECD p. 60
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The case for subsidizing fertilizer during the period of introducing
fertilizer use is fairly strong for two reasons. First it provides initial
incentive to use fertilizer. Secondly, unlike product prices it benefits
only those who adopt the new technique hence, limiting program costs. Two
issues need to be considered in connection with subsidies, and those are
the length of the subsidy period as well as the magnitude of the subsidy
itself. Opinion has been raised that the fertilizer subsidy program in
Lesotho has extended beyond the fertilizer introductory period and should
be removed.
Hesling^ in his study on rainfall, fertilizer application and crop
yield in Lesotho states that farmers in Lesotho are making greater use of
fertilizer. He argues that there is a perceived benefit to doing so, and
he questions why earlier studies in Lesotho and present day studies all
show a high level of explanation of yields from rainfall alone, while the
study that he conducted identified fertilizers as a major variable.
According to his study there are two major variables affecting crop yields
in Lesotho. They are rainfall and fertilizer.
Hesling reported that before the 1960s at least, Basotho farmers
relied on basic soil fertility. In the last few years fertilizer
utilization has been increasing rapidly. But it is certain that fertilizer
is not being applied at anywhere near the level to produce optimal yields.
Leyritz in his report on fertilizer consumption in Lesotho reported
^ Hesling, L - Rainfall. Fertilizer Application and Crop Yield in
Lesotho. Planning Division Ministry of Agriculture, Maseru 1984.
Leyritz, M - Report on Fertilizer Consumption in Lesotho. Ministry
of Agriculture. Maseru 1979.
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that at the national level, fertilizer material consumption in 1977/78
increased by 34 percent over \')lb/n and has Increased by 128 percent over
the average of the period 1968/69 - \976/n. Fertilizer sales have been
increasing throughout the years.
E. TECHNICAL OPERATIONS UNIT/ FOOD SELF-SUFFICIENCY PROGRAM.
CCPP phased out in 1979, and its functions were taken over by
Technical Operations Unit (TOU) under the Food Self -Sufficiency Program
(FSSP)
.
TOU started operation in 1980/81. Even though TOU started like
CCPP it followed a different approach from that of CCPP later on. As in
the case of CCPP designated potential areas were selected for the program.
The purpose of the program was to increase food production in the
country. The FSSP was designed to produce maize, sorghum, wheat and beans
on 50,000 acres using improved technology consisting of mechanization of
farm operations, and use of a recommended package of inputs.
Procedure
.
TOU covered all stages of production from procurement of inputs
through land preparation to marketing of crops through Co-Op Lesotho. The
purpose of the program was to increase food production in the country. One
of the conditions for entry into the program was the size of the field.
In order for a field to qualify and be included in the program, it had to
be 1.5 acres or more.
TOU mobilized farmers into cooperative blocks. In the beginning all
operations were performed by TOU. Production loans were negotiated by TOU
on behalf of the farmers but remained in the name of TOU.
The farmers were guaranteed a no risk return equal to the average
yield experienced under traditional production practices. The program
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worked well during 1980/81 but losses were incurred, and increased over
the following years. In 1984/85 the program was changed to shift more of
the risk to the farmer. TOU involvement was reduced to providing extension
service and machinery hire. Co-Op Lesotho was given exclusive right to
provide subsidized packages of recommended amount of seed, fertilizer and
other inputs. Loans were made directly to farmers and were administered
by Lesotho Agricultural Development Bank (LABD)
.
The Agricultural Bank did not require collateral for any of the loans
it extended to the participants in the program. But unlike CCPP, the
farmers in FSSP had to bear the full cost of their operations except a
fixed amount of subsidy for inputs. If a farmer falls to repay the loan,
he will not qualify for a loan from the bank in the following season. But,
special arrangement would be made for farmers who were unable to pay back
their loans because of crop failure due to natural disasters such as
drought or hail.
Lesotho has had direct subsidies in some form for staple crops for
several years. Those that applied to the 1986/87 summer crops and 1987/88
winter crops were a subsidy of 30 percent on the cost of fertilizer and
a subsidy of M40/acre for TOU input package for maize, wheat, sorghum and
beans. These were Intended to offer about the same degree of incentive
for farmers to use fertilizer. However, for farmers using TOU services,
the fertilizer subsidy was part of the subsidy to reduce the price farmers
paid for packages that included Improved seed, insecticides and mechanized
operations
.
The farmers participating in the latest TOU program were required to
use the minimum input package for each crop which included seed,
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fertilizer and insect control chemicals and to utilize discing and
planting services of TOU
.
Evaluation and participation.
Table 15 reports yield and acreage planted under TOU for maize from
1980/81 to 1985/86.
Table 16: Area Planted, Number of farmers, Production and Yield
Maize, TOU 1980/81 - 1986/87
Year Area Farmers Prod. Yield (National yield)
acres no. tons kg/acre kg/acre
1980/81 14392 3634 13920 967 774
1981/82 61440 16924 24939 406 608
1982/83 61160 16853 18001 343 601
1983/84 50900 18954 9976 196 573
1984/85 37127 9040 38092 1012 637
1985/86 36167 27490 760 611
1986/87 36875 - 30365 823 -
Sources: 1) TOU Reports - Area, No. of farmers, production and yield.
2) Agricultural Situation Report 1986 - national yield.
Table 16 shows that in 1981/82 acreage planted to maize increased
rapidly. This was in response to the lucrative conditions provided for
participation in the program. But starting in 1984 when a new system
started, acreage of maize planted declined from 61440 acres in 1981/82 to
37127 in 1984/85. In 1981/82 the average yield for maize (967) for TOU was
above the national average yield for maize (774) and was below the
national average for 3 consecutive years , and finally exceeded the
national average from 1984/85 to 1985/86. The national average yield for
maize shows clearly a downward trend, while TOU yield is variable among
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the years
.
F. DIRECT INPUT SUBSIDY.
Input subsidies especially In fertilizer have been operational for
many years in Lesotho. Overall subsidy applied is a subsidy of 30 percent
on the cost of fertilizer, and a subsidy of M40/acre for TOU package.
In many developing countries , fertilizer users represent a fairly
small percentage of farmers . One important consideration for the farmer
will be the risk element that he has to face. A farmer who decides to use
fertilizer runs a higher risk in this respect, because he has to make a
cash outlay which his neighbor, who decides against it does not have to
make
.
In the case of Lesotho, there has not been much of supply response
from input (fertilizer) subsidy. Production of staple food has fallen
short of expectations and no progress has been made toward reducing
dependence on imports. However it is mentioned that the low yields
attained are a result of a combination of factors some of which could not
be controlled.
A point to make is that some farmers who use a package of inputs
including fertilizer, improved seeds and chemicals combined with
mechanical operations do realize substantially higher yields than others
in the same area despite the lack of rainfall.
G. PRESENT OUTPUT INCENTIVES
Currently the minimum producer prices for maize and wheat paid by the
mills in Maseru and Maputsoe are gazetted annually at harvest time. The
gazetted producer prices are substantially higher than the producer prices
for the same commodities in the RSA.
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Lesotho producer prices for maize and wheat are sustainable because
the Lesotho prices are at parity with the landed cost of imports at the
border. The higher price paid to farmers however does not increase the
cost of maize meal or flour to consumers compared with the prices for
imported products.
A lower price is gazetted for deliveries to Co-Op Lesotho depots.
This price reflects the margin allowed Co-Op Lesotho to cover its costs
of handling and transporting the produce to the mills.
The output Incentives of higher producer prices are regarded as
substantial, and would warrant a greater response from producers. But as
is the case even with the input subsidy, there is no evidence in Lesotho
to assess the effects of output Incentives. Most of the produce is still
traded In the informal market. On the other hand there has not been the
expected increase In the quantity of grains produced. Low^ has another
opinion concerning producer prices. He suggests that raising producer
prices will have no influence on subsistence or deficit-producing
households whose production does not enter the market, whereas, raising
retail prices can be expected to induce deficit producers to substitute
own production for purchased food. He asserts that this implies that
consumer subsidies which lower retail food prices are Inconsistent with
policy of Increased food production.
'Low Allan - Agricultural Development in Southern Africa 1986 p. 157.
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Table 17: Comparative Maize Prices - Lesotho and South Africa
I'ilb/n to 1986/87
Year Lesotho South Africa
1976/77
1977/78
1978/79
1979/80
1980/81
1981/82
1982/83
1983/84
1984/85
1985/86
1986/87
(Maloti/ton)
55.00
64.50
72.00
106.00
109.00
133.00
175.00
191.00
229.00
256.85
279.86
(Rand/ton)*
65 .00
73 .50
79 .95
100 .15
118 ,25
118 .25
134 ,05
167 ,55
218 ,55
218 ,60
240 ,35
* Ml. 00 - Rl.DO
Source: Ministry of Agriculture - Lesotho Agricultual Situation Report
1986.
Table 18: Comparison of Wheat Prices - Lesotho and South Africa
1976/77 to 1986/87
Year Lesotho South Africa
1976/77
1977/78
1978/79
1979/80
1980/81
1981/82
1982/83
1983/84
1984/85
1985/86
1986/87
(Maloti/ton)
108.14
114.29
123.00
180.00
208.79
258.57
279.61
300.58
330.43
339.00
390.60
(Rand/ton)
117 .94
117 .94
132 .09
179 .44
208 .54
233 .16
285 ,75
265 ,75
289 ,03
312 ,25
347 ,70
Source: Ministry of Agriculture - Agricultural Situation Report 1986.
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CHAPTER VI
A PROPOSED ENHANCED OUTPUT INCENTIVE PROGRAM.
A currently proposed Enhanced Output Incentive Program (EOIP)
entails a concept of increasing producer returns as a new strategy for
boosting crop production in Lesotho. Unlike the present Incentive programs
which basically focus on input subsidy and support prices, EOIP would
make direct payments to those producers achieving yields above minimum or
target yields. Direct payments to those particular farmers will not
directly affect the general level of prices for consumers except as they
may be affected by changes in the supply and demand balance in informal
markets. Given the existing price guarantees and the relationship of these
prices to uncontrolled imports, an increase in the general level of price
supports is not possible. Increased payment therefore must be a direct
payment to producers who are providing higher than average yields.
Evidence from the U.S. commodity programs is that direct payment programs
are expensive. However if done on a selective basis that applies to only
a portion of production, they may not be as expensive.
Potential economic advantages and disadvantages.
This program like others will have advantages and disadvantages.
Advantages
:
1. Impact on supply - increased supply will have potential for lower
local food prices.
2. Producers will realize rewards for management.
3. Program will identify better management and allow producers the
opportunity to expand.
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4. The program will require budget expenditures only with positive
results
.
5. Overall advantage will be increased food production for the
country.
Disadvantages
.
1. The program may result in displaced small farmers.
2. Widespread use of the program will require an extensive management
program by government.
3. Substantial opportunity for misrepresentation and fraud in the
system will be a possibility.
4. Need to relate production to individual field. Each field would
have to be measured and a normal or expected minimum yield for the
field established.
5. Yield must be related to relevant weather conditions each year.
6. Smuggling of produce from farm to farm will possibly occur.
Administration of the program.
The level of budget available for the program is an important factor
especially in those years when production is very high and a greater part
of the producers are paid. Consideration should be given to the magnitude
of the budget to determine whether it can be high enough to stay in
manageable limits and government capabilities.
Since the program will be carried out on individual fields, farmers
fields will have to be measured. Measuring of fields would not be very
difficult since this has been done before in other programs such as TOU.
It would have to be determined what a normal yield from a particular field
or location would be.
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The following is a check list of the things that would have to be
done to run the program.
1. Farmers intending to participate should register in advance
2. Fields of participating farmers must be measured
3. Crops eligible to be planted on each field determined
4. The fields would be classified and yield potential established for the
crops planted.
5. Harvested yields must be measured for each farmer, and his or her crop
entitlement calculated.
6. The eligibility and bonus amount of each farmer certified to the
payment agency
.
7
.
Payment of the incentive amount made promptly at time of market
delivery
.
Potential for crop insurance
.
Since the farmers participating in the program will bear all the risk
of crop failure whether caused by poor management, inadequate investment
in inputs , or climatic conditions , there will certainly be a need to
incorporate crop insurance into the whole machinery of the program.
Presently crop insurance is not available for farmers in Lesotho. It is
anticipated that producers will incur high costs in machinery purchase
and inputs in order to attain the high yields, hence it is only proper to
provide the means through which high crop risk now existing in Lesotho
could be reduced by the introduction of crop insurance to protect the
farmers. Moreover, farmers involved in the program will have increased
outlay for the crop Insurance
.
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Length of the program.
The duration or length of Che program will have to be determined. The
length of the program is important to assure the producers of enough time
to be able to pay off loans and to also receive positive returns to their
investments
,
Desirability of a pilot project.
An EOIP direct payment plan will be a new approach in Lesotho. There
appears to be little precedent for such a program throughout third world
countries generally. Because of this reason risk of failure may be reduced
through a pilot project designed to test project potential. The pilot
project will serve as a research instrument to determine
:
1. Participation by farmers, in terms of numbers and by size of farm.
2. Costs and potential budget exposure for both crop insurance and
payments to producers
.
3. Cost effectiveness of the program, that is; will the program be
profitable to the producers justifying their investment and to the
government as well
.
4. Impact on local prices to consumers as production is increased, and
5. Potential impacts on the size of the farm.
It may be simpler to manage and implement an input subsidy program
than to administer an output incentive program of the kind explained.
Input subsidy may cover all crops and all types of farmers including the
subsistence farmer, but the output incentive may have a potential for
response from the already successful few who own tractors and large
holdings of land.
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CHAPTER VII
CONCLUDING REMARKS
The policy objectives and targets of the Ministry of Agriculture are
clearly reported in every Five Year Development Plan. In every one of
them the government has stipulated its desire to place a high priority on
increasing agricultural production and to attaining self-sufficiency in
staple food crops in the country. An overall policy objective is to
substantially reduce the very heavy dependence on imports of food crops
into the country
.
Crop production data as well as yields for maj or food crops has
indicated that achievement of agricultural productivity targets has never
been realized. The failure to achieve increased productivity has persisted
despite large lumps of donor and local funds invested in agriculture
.
Investment in agriculture over the past several years has been enormous,
but the returns have fallen far short of expectations. There is therefore
due concern regarding justification of the heavy expenditure in
agriculture which has resulted in disappointing and negligible returns to
such efforts.
Lesotho has a long history of agricultural development support which
has had disturbing results. There are many factors contributing to such
a state of affairs
.
One factor that has been observed is that the
transition from donor to local self-sustaining development, after donor
support has stopped has not occurred. One contributing factor to the lack
of continued activity as mentioned before is the heavy financing of the
development projects which neither the government nor the farmers can
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afford after the external project funds are withdrawn. The design of the
projects are such that only temporary effects are realized.
The risks and natural disasters associated with agriculture are some
of the major causes of low productivity in Lesotho. It has been mentioned
that a high proportion of crop failure in Lesotho is caused by severe
drought as most of the agriculture is rain fed. Development of crop
production under irrigation may be a possible alternative to alleviate
the drought problem.
The failure of many development projects and the riskiness of
agriculture in Lesotho has resulted in the negative attitude among
farmers regarding the ability of the government to improve their welfare
through proj ects and programs . With the bad experience the farmers have
had from development assistance, it becomes a difficult but important task
for policy-makers to regain the farmers confidence in government actions
concerning agriculture.
Any conceivable method of raising agricultural and food production
to make progress toward meeting food needs have to rely on raising yields
per hectare. Use of fertilizers among other things combined with other
inputs and implementation of proper cultural practices is important. Even
though fertilizer has long been adopted in Lesotho, the progress towards
increased yields has not been attained. It has been observed by some
writers that improper use of fertilizers as a substitute for good crop
husbandry makes it impossible to attain expected results. Until such
practices are eliminated, fertilizer use will not achieve the expected
targets
.
Another factor that needs to be considered is that even after the
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fertilizer has been subsidized, there are still a lot of farmers who
cannot afford to buy it
. The subsidy may therefore be beneficial to and
be utilized by the more successful, advanced and well established farmers.
This portion of the farmers may include full time advanced farm operators
and part time farmers who have permanent employment outside agriculture.
The argument that low producer prices have brought about
disincentives for food production in developing countries has been
suggested by some authors
.
In the case of Lesotho , substantially high
producer prices have been offered farmers and yet production and yields
of the major food crops have stagnated despite the comparatively higher
prices. Perhaps the thing to look at is the adequacy of the package of
incentives offered to farmers
.
While implementing agricultural policy, consideration should be given
to consumer prices especially in countries such as Lesotho where the
majority of the population are members of farm household and a significant
proportion of these households produce less than they consume
.
Lesotho has had both input subsidy and a product price support
policy. Each of these policy alternatives has advantages and
disadvantages. The outstanding advantage of subsidizing purchased inputs
like fertilizer rather than raising product prices is that the cost of
the subsidy program is directly related to the utilization of practices
that increase productivity^. An argument for higher producer prices is
that input subsidies are of no use in situations where increases in
agricultural productivity come from additions of non-purchasable inputs.
^Ray, Susanta K; Cummings, Ralph; Herdt , Robert - Policy Planning for
Agricultural Development. Westview Press, Boulder Colorado, 1979
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Also it is common to find that input prices are administered prices which
change only occasionally while product prices may fluctuate with market
forces , The price uncertainty will decrease if product prices are
stabilized through price support policy
.
Another advantage for price supports is that the impact of input
price subsidy on different crops cannot be controlled. That is. a subsidy
on fertilizer will ensure that more fertilizer is used, but it cannot
direct the added fertilizer to a particular crop. With these
considerations the weight of the argument seems to fall in favor of
product price supports with continued efforts to reduce input costs by
obtaining all production and marketing efficiencies.
Agricultural productivity is undoubtedly low in Lesotho. In many
cases the low productivity has been linked to the huge migration of men
from Lesotho to the South African mines. Wykstra''- concludes that while on
an annual basis surplus of labor exists, for peak period a scarcity
prevails and significantly constrains the number of acres that can be
effectively cropped, hence labor shortage in Lesotho constrains
agricultural output. The implication here is that labor migration should
be curtailed as a precondition for increasing agricultural productivity.
The author's opinion is that agricultural development should be pursued
regardless of the course of migration since what is considered a problem
entails a very long and slow process. The withdrawal of labor from the
rural areas by migration must be faced, but so must the potential for
sustaining and improving agricultural productivity.
^Wykstra Roland - Farm Labor in Lesotho: Scarcity or Surplus. LASA
Discussion Paper No. 5 . Ministry of Agriculture. Lesotho 1978. p. 35
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As far as labor migration is concerned one might suggest that labor
migration should be allowed to continue since the migrants bring more
earnings into the country than can be realized in agriculture, and these
earnings can be used to offset food production deficits through food
imports. Looking at this argument closely
,
one may realize that the
benefits of migration may exceed its costs in a short run, but in the long
run the harmful effects of a migratory system on local agriculture will
inevitably reverse the ratio of benefits to costs.
The drawbacks of this policy option are beyond just the consideration
of agricultural output that is lost because men are away. But other
effects attributed to labor migration are the psychological effects on the
migrant himself, as a man of two worlds, unable to reconcile the demands
of subsistence agriculture at home with those of wage employment abroad.
There are social effects on migrants ' wives left behind for years to
assume the burdens of family, and migrants children growing up without
knowing their father. The migrant labor system tends to prevent the
acquisition of skills, with the result that the migrants become forever
undifferentiated units of unskilled labor^ . Most of all , the political
effects of such a policy would be disastrous on public policy in Lesotho
in which every decision must refer back to the threat of the potential
power of RSA to close her borders and to threaten Lesotho's livelihood.
Lesotho has experienced this before and the results were very
frightening. The costs of dependency are gradual but real and
significant
.
^ Setai Bethuel- The Political Economy of South Africa: The Making of
Poverty
.
The University Press of America Inc. 1979
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The next question is, should the government put a total ban on labor
migration. In the case of Lesotho, total withdrawal of migrants from South
Africa would impose even more problems for Lesotho's economy since at the
present time more than 50 percent of Lesotho's GNP comes from migrant
earnings
.
Moreover , Lesotho ' s capacity to generate income earning
opportunities at home is strictly limited and is certainly out of all
proportion to the income earning opportunities of continued migration to
RSA. Any significant fall in the numbers of men working outside Lesotho
would have a big impact on rural incomes.
The opportunity cost in 1977/78 of preventing a migrant from
migrating was M1247.00 (Guma reported in JASPA Report 1979). This compares
well with results of a survey reported by Plath (1986) in a survey of
migrants in Nyakosoba area where migrants interviewed reported that they
would not migrate if they can earn M1536.00^ in Lesotho. The question is
how can Lesotho provide the migrants with this kind of remuneration to
stop them from going to the mines.
Since the migration problem is a long term issue which cannot be
solved within a short period of time , a suggestion would be to tax
deferred payments of migrant workers to finance agricultural development
projects in Lesotho. The tax money could be used to finance for example,
irrigation schemes throughout the country since drought is one of the risk
factors in agricultural production in Lesotho.
'^Plath Joel; Holland David; Carvalho Joe - Labor Migration in Southern
Africa and Agricultural Development: Some Lessons from Lesotho. The
Journal of Developing Areas. Volume 21 No. Jan. 1987.
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In view of the complexity of the problem of migration, Lesotho must
pursue a policy of maximizing domestic employment in the hope of gradually
reducing the outflow of migrant labor.
Lofchie (1989) has pointed out that most African governments have
intervened in agricultural sectors in a variety of ways. One of these, by
far the most common is direct government regulation of producer prices.
Contrary to many governments intentions to protect the small- scale
farmers by regulating producer prices, African governments employ their
ability to establish control of agricultural pricing to suppress the farm
gate prices of agricultural commodities far below levels that would have
prevailed if a free market in agricultural commodities had been allowed
to operate. Eicher (1982) also argues that there is substantial evidence
that agricultural pricing policies have tended to have adverse effects on
the gap between rural and urban incomes.
A lack of functioning agricultural marketing agencies In most African
countries has been cited as one of the major reasons for the continent's
agricultural decline. They are almost universally characterized by waste,
Inefficiency, mismanagement and corruption. Hence it is vital that
improvement be made in management and operation of parastatal marketing
agencies to better serve the farmers.
With so little having been achieved regarding agricultural development
and productivity, efforts should still be made to find solution to the
state of agriculture in Lesotho. Mistakes have been done in the past, and
hopefully, much has been learned from past experiences and failures. As
more alternatives are sought like the proposed Enhanced Output Incentive
Program (If implemented as planned) the hope is that an adequate and
68
proper package of incentives will stimulate the farm producer to provide
for his domestic requirement and to produce more for the market
.
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ABSTRACT
Increasing food production especially the production of the
staple food crops , and improving the income of the small farmers have
always been primary goals of agricultural development in Lesotho. The
major instruments to reach such objectives have been in the form of price
incentives, input subsidies as well as introduction of new technology
packages
.
However for past several years, agricultural output and productivity
have both been very low, resulting in importation of large amounts of
maize and other food crops.
Investment in agriculture over many years has been enormous with
regard to donor financing and local contribution, and yet corresponding
results have fallen far short of expectations
.
Agricultural development in Lesotho faces a number of problems some
of which cannot be controlled. The fundamental problems that have empeded
success of the achievement of increased agricultural productivity are
related to adverse climatic conditions and improper crop husbandry
methods, shortage of labor as a result of labor migration to South African
mines, relative returns from farm and off- farm sources, and inefficient
and inappropriate technical and financial support to agriculture
.
As an encouragement to boost agricultural production and increase
crop yields, input subsidy has been applied especially to fertilizer. Also
the minimum producer prices for major crops are set by the government and
are set higher than producer prices in neighboring South Africa as an
incentive to producers.
Up to this point there has not been any evidence of supply response
as a result of incentives mentioned above
.
Yields for major crops are
declining despite the increase in fertilizer consumption which might
suggest that inadequate amount of fertilizer is used.
In light of the problems facing agricultural development in Lesotho
appropriate incentive packages need to be developed and new strategies and
policies be implemented to increase the agricultural productivity
.
